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Bioterrorism events have been rare until recently. Many clinical laboratories may not be
familiar with handling specimens from a possible bioterrorism attack. Therefore, they
should be aware of their own responsibilities and limitations in the handling and
treatment of such specimens, and what to do if they are requested to process clinical
samples. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has developed the Laboratory
Response Network to provide an organized response system for the detection and
diagnosis of biological warfare agents based on laboratory testing abilities and facilities.
There are potentially many biological warfare agents, but probably a limited number of
agents would be encountered in case of an attack, and their identification and laboratory
safety will be discussed.
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B I O S A F E T Y
A great variety of biological agents could poten-
tially be used for biological warfare, but fortu-
nately only a few agents can be efficiently
disseminated in the community. As well as being
easily dispersed (1–5-mm particles), the ‘ideal’ bio-
logical agents should be highly lethal, easily pro-
duced in large quantities, stable, preferably
transmitted by the aerosol route or from person
to person, resistant to standard antibiotics, and not
preventable by vaccination [1]. This limits the list
of possible agents to certain bacteria (Bacillus
anthracis, Brucella spp., Clostridium botulinum, Yer-
sinia pestis, and Francisella tularensis) and viruses
(smallpox and viral hemorrhagic fevers) [1,2].
Among these, Bacillus anthracis and smallpox are
the two agents with the most potential to fulfill the
criteria for mass casualties [1].
Until recently, bioterrorism was a very rare
event, and the agents involved in it were hardly
ever encountered in (clinical) laboratories; hence
laboratory personnel are not familiar with the
appearance and characteristics of these agents,
or with the reception, handling and laboratory
treatment of clinical specimens. Owing to the pre-
sent events, clinical laboratories may be requested
to process clinical or environmental specimens
(from real or hoax attacks). Therefore, all micro-
biological laboratories should be familiar with the
methods and precaution measures involved in
handling these agents.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) has created the Laboratory Response Net-
work to provide an organized response system for
the detection and diagnosis of biological warfare
agents based on laboratory testing abilities and
facilities [3,4]. There are four levels of laboratory
capacity (A–D), and each level has designated
core-testing capacities. Level A laboratories have
the minimum core capacity, and they would rule
out suspected isolates by simple testing and refer
them to a higher-level laboratory. Level D labora-
tories, like the CDC, are biological safety level 4
(BSL-4) facilities, and they have the highest capa-
city and most advanced techniques (Figure 1).
Most clinical, hospital and private laboratories
are classified as level A, operating at BSL-2. Level
A laboratories are most likely to be the first con-
tacted and questioned with regard to specimen
collection and shipment, culture, and treatment.
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Although these laboratories are not intended to
actually handle critical biological agents, they
might receive clinical samples initially not sus-
pected to contain these agents. Consequently, even
level A laboratories should have the necessary
facilities, equipment and competence to process
critical biological agents [3].
In the present situation, all laboratories hand-
ling clinical and environmental specimens should
reach a basic standard:
1. Knowledge of the current biosafety level within
the laboratory.
2. Development and availability of protocols
related to the chain of guardianship.
3. Collection, preservation and shipment of speci-
mens, as well as culture and identification of
targeted agents.
4. Knowledge of the location of the nearest higher-
level reference laboratory, and of current guide-
lines to ensure the safe handling and shipment
of biological agents.
5. Knowledge of the basic characteristics of the
current targeted agents [3,4].
Containment involves the use of safe methods
for managing infectious materials in the laboratory
environment. Its purpose is to reduce or eliminate
exposure of laboratory workers and the environ-
ment to potentially hazardous agents [5]. Primary
containment is the protection of personnel and the
immediate laboratory environment; secondary
containment is the protection of the environment
external to the laboratory [5]. Hence, the three
most important topics in laboratory safety are:
(1) laboratory practice and techniques; (2) safety
equipment; and (3) design of facilities.
Laboratory personnel must always be aware of
the potential hazards when working with clinical
specimens. As a result, strict adherence to stan-
dard microbiological practices and techniques is
the most important factor in containment, and
each laboratory should develop a biosafety man-
ual. To minimize and/or eliminate exposure to
certain agents, laboratory personnel must be con-
tinually trained to ensure awareness of diagnostic
and preventive measures.
Safety equipment comprises primary barriers
against biological materials, including biological
safety cabinets (BSCs), enclosed containers, and
other engineering controls. Safety equipment may
also include items for personal protection, such as
gloves, face shields, and safety glasses, which are
often used in combination with a BSC. There are
currently three types of BSC: open-fronted class I
and II BSCs offer protection to laboratory person-
nel and to the environment; class II BSCs addi-
tionally provide protection from external
contamination; and the gas-tight class III BSC
provides the highest attainable level of protection
to personnel and environment [5].
The secondary barriers will depend on the
risk of transmission of specific agents (Table 1)
[5]. The design and the construction of the
laboratory facility form part of these secondary
barriers. They should contribute to the labora-
tory workers’ protection, as well as protect the
community environment from infectious agents
which may be accidentally released from the
laboratory.
A detailed description of biosafety level prac-
tices and classification of BSCs can be found in the
4th edition of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and National Institutes of Health pub-
lication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical
Laboratories, which is also available on the internet
(http://www.cdc.gov) [5]. BSL-1 represents a
basic level of containment with no recommenda-
tions for special primary or secondary barrier
precautions. In BSL-1 laboratories, work on an
open bench is performed with microorganisms
that cause no disease in healthy adults, but may
behave as opportunistic pathogens in very young
or older patients and immunocompromised indi-
viduals. Moderate-risk organisms, such as hepati-
tis B virus and salmonellae, which may cause
disease of varying severity, should be treated in
a BSL-2 laboratory. The primary hazards relate to
percutaneous or mucous membrane exposure, or
ingestion of infectious materials. Procedures with
aerosol or splash potential that may increase the
Figure 1 Laboratory Response Network laboratory levels
[5].
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risk of exposure must be conducted in a BSC, and
other primary and secondary barriers must be
available. In a BSL-3 facility, all laboratory manip-
ulations are performed in a BSC, and more empha-
sis is placed on primary and secondary barriers.
Exposure to infectious aerosols, ingestion and
autoinoculation are the primary hazards to the
personnel in contiguous areas, the community,
and the environment. Examples are Mycobacterium
tuberculosis and Coxiella burnetii. Exotic agents that
pose the risk of life-threatening disease, which
may be transmitted via aerosol, and for which
there is no available vaccine or therapy, must be
handled in a BSL-4 facility. Manipulations that
may lead to exposure of the mucous membrane
or broken skin, including autoinoculation, pose
the primary hazards. The laboratory worker must
be completely isolated from aerosolized infectious
materials by working in a class III BSC or in a full-
body, air-supplied positive-pressure personnel
suit (Table 2). Mainly, viral agents are processed
in a BSL-4 laboratory [5].
For bacterial warfare agents, activities concern-
ing specimen handling and diagnosis of suspected
cultures should be forwarded to at least a BSL-2
facility (Table 3). This implies that all specimens,
after reception and labeling, should be further
handled in a class I or II BSC. Manipulation and
production of large quantities of bacterial cultures,
and other activities which might lead to aerosol
formation, should be avoided, and should be
referred to a BSL-3 laboratory.
Table 1 Biosafety levels
BSL [5] Agents Practices Safety equipment Facilities
1 Not known to
consistently cause
disease in healthy
adults
Standard microbiological
practices
None required Open benchtop sink
required
2 Associated with
human disease,
hazard ¼percutaneous
injury ingestion
mucous membrane
exposure
BSL-1 practice plus:
limited access
biohazard warning signs
‘sharps’ precautions
biosafety manual defining
any needed waste
decontamination or medical
surveillance policies
Primary barriers ¼
class I or II BSCs
or other physical
containment
devices used for all
manipulations of agents
that cause splashes or
aerosols of
infectious materials
PPEs: laboratory coats;
gloves; face protection
as needed
BSL-1 plus:
autoclave available
3 Indigenous or exotic
agents: with potential
for aerosol transmission
disease may have serious
or lethal consequences
BSL-2 practice plus:
controlled access
decontamination of all
waste decontamination of
laboratory clothing
before laundering
baseline serum
Primary barriers ¼
class I or II BCSs
or other physical
containment devices
used for all open
manipulation of agents
PPEs: protective
laboratory clothing;
gloves; respiratory
protection as needed
BSL-2 plus:
physical separation
from access corridors
self-closing, double-
door exhausted air
not recirculated
negative airflow into
laboratory
4 Dangerous/exotic
agents: which pose
high risk of life-
threatening disease
aerosol transmitted
laboratory infections
or related agents with
unknown risk of
transmission
BSL-3 practices plus:
clothing change before
entering
shower on exit
all material
decontaminated on
exit from facility
Primary barriers ¼
all procedures
conducted in
class III BSCs
or class I or II BSCs in
combination with
full-body, air-supplied,
positive-pressure
personnel suit
BSL-3 plus:
separate building or
isolated zone
dedicated supply and
exhaust, vacuum, and
decontamination
systems other
requirements outlined
in the text
BSL, biosafety level; BSC, biological safety cabinet; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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Bacillus anthracis, Y. pestis and specimens con-
taining botulism toxins can be safely handled
using BSL-2 practices, but BSL-2–3 practices are
recommended for F. tularensis and Brucella spp.
Smallpox and the hemorrhagic fever viruses are
extremely infectious, and specimen collection,
handling and further treatment should be referred
to a BSL-4 facility (Table 2) [4].
Table 2 Microbiology biosafety for biological warfare agents
BSL
Agent
Specimen
handling
Culture
handling
Recommended precautions for
level A laboratories
Bacillus anthracis 2 2 BSL-2:
activities involving clinical
material collection and
diagnostic quantities of
infectious cultures
BSL-3:
activities with high
potential for aerosol or
droplet production
Brucella spp.a 2 3 BSL-2:
activities limited to
collection, transport and
plating of clinical
material
BSL-3:
all activities involving
manipulations of
cultures
Clostridium botulinumb 2 2 BSL-2:
activities with materials
known to contain toxin or
potentially containing toxin
must be handled in a
biological safety
cabinet (class II) with a
laboratory coat, disposable
surgical gloves, and a face
shield (as needed)
BSL-3:
activities with high
potential for aerosol or
droplet production
Francisella tularensisc 2 3 BLS-2:
activities limited to
collection, transport and
plating of clinical material
BSL-3:
all activities involving
manipulations
of cultures
Yersinia pestisd 2 2 BSL-2:
activities involving clinical
material collection and
diagnostic
quantities of
infectious cultures
BSL-3:
activities with high
potential for aerosol or
droplet production
Smallpoxe 4 4 BSK-4:
specimen collection/transport
Hemorrhagic fever
virusesf
4 4 BSL-4:
specimen collection/transport
aLaboratory-acquired brucellosis has occurred through: ‘sniffing’ cultures; aerosols generated by centrifugation; mouth
pipetting; accidental parenteral inoculations; sprays into eyes, nose, and mouth; and by direct contact with clinical
specimens.
bExposure to toxin is the primary laboratory hazard, since absorption can occur through direct contact with skin, eyes, or
mucous membranes, including the respiratory tract. The toxin can be neutralized by 0. 1 M sodium hydroxide. Clostridium
botulinum is inactivated by a 1 : 10 dilution of household bleach. The contact time is 20 min. If the material contains both
toxin and organisms, the spill must be sequentially treated with bleach and sodium hydroxide for a total contact time of
40 min.
cLaboratory-acquired tularemia infection has been more commonly associated with cultures than with clinical materials/
animals. Direct skin/mucous membrane contact with cultures, parenteral inoculation, ingestion and aerosol exposure have
resulted in infection.
dSpecial care should be taken to avoid the generation of aerosols.
eIngestion, parenteral inoculation and droplet or aerosol exposure of mucous membranes or broken skin to infectious
fluids or tissues are the primary hazards for laboratory workers.
fRespiratory exposure to infectious aerosols, mucous membrane exposure to infectious droplets and accidental parenteral
inoculation are the primary hazards for laboratory workers.
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Table 3 Specimens, specimen processing and diagnostic tests for biological warfare agents
Agent Form Specimen Media Techniques
Bacillus anthracis Respiratory Blood SBA Culture
Sputum CA Serology
Pleural fluid MAC Amplification
Cutaneous Blood Toxin detection
Vesicular swabs Antigen detection with
electrochemiluminescence
Gastrointestinal Blood
Gastric aspirate
Ascites
Stool PLET
Meningitis Blood
Liquor
F. tularensis Respiratory Blood SBA Culture
Wounds Sputum CA Serology
Bronchial/tracheal
wash
CHA Amplification
Pleural fluid TMA
Lymph node BCYE
Conjunctival scraping
Biopsy
Gastric aspirate
Brucella spp. Blood SBA Culture
Sputum CA Serology
Throat MAC
Bronchial/tracheal wash TMA
Biopsy BCYE
Abscess
Serum
Y. pestis Pneumonic Blood SBA Culture
Bubonic Sputum MAC F1 antigen detection
Septicemic Throat BHIB Amplification
Bronchial/tracheal wash
Lymph node
Botulism Food-borne Enema fluid Mouse bioassay (toxin
detection)
Wound Food Toxin gene amplification
Infant Gastric fluid Culture
Intestinal fluid
Nasal swab
Serum
Stool
Vomitus
Wound/tissue
Environmental sample
Smallpox Rash Vesicular fluid Chorioallantoic
membranes of
chicken embryos
Electron microscopy
Lesions Human cell cultures Giemsa stain
Saliva Cell culture
Biopsy Serology
Serum Amplification
VHF Blood Human cell cultures Culture
Serum Serology
Throat swab/washings Immunohistochemical
Liver biopsy Amplification
Cerebrospinal fluid
SBA, sheep blood agar; CA, chocolate agar; MAC, McConkey agar; PLET, polymyxin–lysozyme–EDTA–thallous acetate
agar; TMA, Thayer–Martin agar; CHA, cysteine heart agar; BCYE, buffered charcoal yeast extract; BHI, brain–heart
infusion broth; VHF, viral hemorrhagic fever.
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B A C I L L U S A N T H R A C I S
Infections due to Bacillus anthracis may lead to
three clinical manifestations. Cutaneous anthrax
is seen in 95% of the cases, while inhalation
anthrax is found in only 5% of cases. Gastrointest-
inal anthrax is very rare and is encountered in less
than 1% of cases [4]. All three manifestations of
anthrax may lead to bacteremia, which is often
fatal. Meningitis may occur as a complication of
Bacillus anthracis bacteremia [6,7].
The Bacillus genus comprises more than 60 dif-
ferent species. Bacillus species are Gram-positive
aerobic or facultative anaerobic bacilli that pro-
duce endospores [7]. In clinical specimens, the
bacteria often appear in short chains, but in vitro,
longer chains of bacilli are formed [6,8]. The bac-
teria grow well on sheep blood agar and are
usually catalase positive [7]. Most Bacillus species
can be divided into three groups, depending on
the morphology of the spore and the sporangium.
Bacillus anthracis belongs to the Bacillus cereus
group, which is composed of at least seven closely
related species [7,9,10]. Bacillus species can be
differentiated from other spore-forming bacteria,
such as Clostridium species, by the formation of
ellipsoidal spores without swelling of the sporan-
gium, in the presence of oxygen [7,8,11]. Spores are
rarely seen in clinical specimens, since the CO2
content of the body prevents spore formation [6].
Toxin production, which is thought to inhibit the
immune response, and capsule formation, which
inhibits phagocytosis of vegetative anthrax bacilli,
are the two major virulence factors of Bacillus
anthracis. Smears stained with the M’fadyean stain
(polychrome methylene blue stain) show dark blue
bacilli, surrounded by a pink capsule [8,11]. In an
India ink wet preparation, the capsule is not stained,
but clearhalosaroundBacillusanthracis bacilli canbe
seen[8].TheGramstainisnotsuitableforvisualizing
the capsule of Bacillus anthracis, but can show typical
Gram-positive square-ended rods (box cars) [8].
Depending on the clinical manifestations, different
specimens can be obtained for culture of Bacillus
anthracis (Table 3). Antibiotic treatment may quickly
sterilize blood and tissues. Although residual forms
may still be seen in clinical smears, specimens
should be obtained before antibiotic therapy is
initiated [8].
To obtain a suspension of cells, clinical speci-
mens should be mixed with sterile nutrient broth
(cave aerosol formation) [11]. Bacillus anthracis and
other Bacillus species are relatively easy to culture,
even on media routinely used in bacteriology
(Table 1). Usually, a sheep blood agar (SBA) or a
chocolate agar (CA) is used. Polymyxin–lyso-
zyme–EDTA–thallous acetate agar (PLET) is a
selective medium that is used for culturing Bacillus
anthracis from heavily contaminated specimens
such as stool [6,8]. All media are incubated under
ambient conditions at 35 8C and are examined after
18–24 h.
For the majority of strains, Bacillus anthracis is
easily identified and differentiated from other
Bacillus species [8,10]. On nutrient agar, colonies
are flat to slightly convex, 2–5 mm in size, similar
to Bacillus cereus, white or gray–white with irre-
gular borders and curly tailing at the edges
(Medusa head appearance). The colonies often
have a firm consistency. Bacillus anthracis is non-
hemolytic, but slight hemolysis may be noticed in
areas of heavy growth [11]. The organism is non-
motile, and a motility test by the hanging drop
method is one of the most useful and reliable
procedures for screening isolates [11]. Bacillus
anthracis does not grow on McConkey agar
(MAC), and capsule formation is not seen if the
bacteria are cultured on artificial media [8]. In the
presence of 0.7% sodium carbonate in the medium
and during incubation in 5–20% CO2, capsule
synthesis by Bacillus anthracis is enhanced and
mucoid colonies are produced [6–8]. If a colony
from a nutrient agar is suspended in defibrinated
blood and incubated for 5 h, a smear of the suspen-
sion may show encapsulated bacteria [8]. In con-
trast to Bacillus cereus and other Bacillus species,
Bacillus anthracis is usually susceptible to penicil-
lin, although resistant strains have been reported
[9]. The most important biochemical features are
summarized in Table 4, although, in the majority
of strains, additional testing is rarely necessary
[8,10].
Serology is useful for the diagnosis of a Bacillus
anthracis infection, but is only retrospective, and
should mainly be used as an epidemiologic tool
[8]. Acute and convalescent serum samples, taken
2–4 weeks apart, are necessary to confirm infec-
tion. Capsular antigens and exotoxin components
are the major immunogenic proteins [2,9]. An
immunochromatographic protective antigen assay
is a very reliable and sensitive test for the detection
of the Bacillus anthracis toxin in sera of patients,
even if the bacteria are no longer viable [8].
An immunomagnetic electrochemiluminescence
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assay may be used to detect antigens, in concen-
trations as low as 0.1–1.0 pg/mL [2].
PCR techniques for the detection of specific
plasmid-borne virulence genes of Bacillus anthra-
cis, such as the toxin genes and enzymes leading to
capsule formation, exist or are under investigation.
Many of these techniques are useful in the
detection and identification of Bacillus anthracis,
but are more likely to be used in non-level A
laboratories [8–10].
F R A N C I S E L L A T U L A R E N S I S
The taxonomy of F. tularensis is still unresolved,
but at present F. tularensis has two biovars: F.
tularensis biovar tularensis, which is the most
pathogenic biovar, and F. tularensis biovar palaearc-
tica, which is less virulent to humans [12].
Transmission of F. tularensis is possible through
the skin, by inhalation or via ingestion [12]. In
laboratory workers not strictly adhering to safety
protocols, infections via damaged skin have been
reported [4,13]. In the case of bioterrorism, inhala-
tion and consequent pneumonia would probably
be the primary mode of transmission.
F. tularensis is an obligate aerobe bacterium,
non-motile, non-encapsulated, and non-spore-
forming. The bacteria are small (0.5–0.2 mm),
pale-staining, Gram-negative uniform coccoba-
cilli, usually pleomorph in older cultures [12,14].
The organism can be distinguished from other
bacteria by its small size, faint bipolar staining
with aniline dyes, fluorescent antibody reaction,
agglutination with a specific antiserum, and lack of
growth or poor growth on ordinary media [12]. F.
tularensis is a fastidious organism that needs the
amino acids cysteine and cystine for growth
[13,14]. It is weakly catalase positive, as well as
oxidase and urease negative. Cysteine heart agar
(CHA), SBA, CA, Thayer–Martin agar (TM),
enriched chocolate agar with cysteine with 9%
sheep blood (CHAB) and buffered charcoal yeast
extract (BCYE) may be used for clinical specimens
(Table 3) [13]. Although growth of F. tularensis in
supplemented broth (trypticase soy broth, brain–
heart infusion, thioglycolate) is poor, its recovery
from clinical specimens is enhanced [12,13]. Broth
cultures should be incubated for 10 days. F. tular-
ensis may grow initially on SBA, CA and TMA, but
subcultures on SBA usually fail to grow [13]. Blood
cultures may become positive after 3–7 days with
the BACTEC system [14]. CO2 may stimulate
growth [12,13]. Viscous materials and skin and
wound scrapings should first be suspended in
broth before being inoculated on plates [12,13].
After 18 h of incubation, pinpoint colonies may
appear, if there is a high colony count in the clinical
specimens [12]. After 2 days of inoculation, the
smooth, shiny and flat colonies reach a size of 1–
1.5 mm. The medium immediately surrounding
colonies is characteristically green in appearance
[4,12–14]. On CA and TMA, colonies are 1–2 mm
indiameter,blue–whitetogray;onCHAandCHAB,
coloniesare2–4 mmindiameterandgreenish–white
[4,13]. Culture plates should be incubated for at least
10 days [13]. The inability of F. tularensis to grow on
MAC or at room temperature can be used for differ-
entiation from Y. pestis [13,14]. F. tularensis is bio-
chemically inert, and testing is thus of little value.
Usually, the diagnosis is based on clinical findings, a
compatible Gram stain, poor growth on SBA and at
room temperature, and a typical metallic sheen of
Table 4 Key characteristics to dif-
ferentiate Bacillus anthracis and other
Bacillus species [7,11] Characteristics Bacillus anthracis
Bacillus cereus and
other Bacillus species
Hemolysis (sheep blood agar)  þ
Motility  þ (usually)
Penicillin susceptibility þ 
Gelatin hydrolysis (7 days)  þ
Salicin fermentation  þ
Enhanced hydrolysis of
p-nitrophenyl-a-D glucoside
in the presence of 1%
Triton X-100
þ 
Growth on phenylethyl
alcohol blood agar
 þ
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colonies on cysteine heart agar with chocolatized
blood [12,14]. Cultures suspected of growing F.
tularensis should be sent to a reference laboratory
for confirmation by agglutination or ELISA tests
[2,14]. Furthermore, a TaqMan 50-nuclease assay
directed against the F. tularensis outer-membrane
protein gene, and a PCR enzyme immunoassay
directed against the tul4 gene, may be applied [2].
B R U C E L L A
Brucella species are small, faintly staining, Gram-
negative, single-appearing coccobacilli or short
rods, arranged in pairs and short chains. They
are non-motile, non-sporulating strict aerobes,
usually oxidase positive, catalase positive, and
urease variable [4,14,16]. The metabolism of Bru-
cella is mainly oxidative on carbohydrates in con-
ventional media [16]. Thiamine, niacin and biotin
are required for growth; some strains require the
addition of serum [16]. The optimal growth tem-
perature is 37 8C, with a range between 10 8C and
40 8C [16]. The genus Brucella has six species—
Brucella abortus, Brucella melitensis, Brucella suis,
Brucella canis, Brucella ovis, and Brucella neoto-
mae—each including different biotypes [16]. Of
those species, the first four are associated with
human disease, Brucella melitensis being consid-
ered the most virulent [12,14]. Reports have been
published of Brucella as an occupational hazard to
laboratory workers [12,14].
Since Brucella infects the reticuloendothelial sys-
tem, blood and bone marrow are crucial clinical
specimens (Table 3). Depending on the infectious
complications, other specimens (cerebrospinal
fluid, biopsies, abscess, etc.) should be submitted
for culture [14,16]. Specimens are refrigerated if
immediate inoculation is not possible [12,16].
Blood and other fluids can be cultured in a Cas-
taneda bottle, incubated with 5–10% CO2 [16].
Other blood culture systems may be used for
detection of Brucella, but for optimal detection
subcultures are needed [12,14,17]. Tissues, fibrous
clots and exudates should be inoculated onto SBA,
CA, MAC, and, if available, BCYE, after being
aseptically crushed [4,14,16]. When contam-
ination is likely, a selective medium should be
used, such as Farrell’s medium, or modified
Thayer–Martin medium [16]. All cultures should
be incubated for 21 days in 5–10% CO2 at 35–37 8C;
for subcultures, 7 days of incubation is sufficient
[4,12,14,16].
Brucella grows slowly, forming small, non-
hemolytic,glistening,convex,bluish–whitecolonies
on SBA. A presumptive identification of Brucella can
be made on the basis of the Gram stain; non-hemo-
lytic colonies that do not ferment glucose or lactose
are obligate aerobes, and are oxidase and urease
positive [12,16]. Urease production can easily be
detected on Christensen urea agar [12,14,16]. The
definitive identification of Brucella species is based
on CO2 requirement, H2S production, sensitivity to
fuchsin, thionin and thionin blue dyes, and agglu-
tination with monospecific sera [4,14,16]. Clinical
laboratories that are not able to identify Brucella
species definitively should try a presumptive iden-
tification/differentiation with other coccobacilli,
leaving the definitive identification to a reference
laboratory (Table 5) [12,14].
Serology is helpful in the diagnosis of infection
due to Brucella. Acute-phase serum should be
obtained at the onset of the infection, followed
by convalescent-phase serum collected after 14–
21 days [16].
Y E R S I N I A P E S T I S
Human plague is caused by Y. pestis, and there are
three clinical forms: bubonic plague, pneumonic
plague, usually secondary to bubonic plague, and
a septicemic form. Y. pestis is a Gram-negative,
facultative anaerobe, and is a member of the Enter-
obacteriaceae [18,19]. In a smear, fat, single or
short-chained, sometimes bipolar, bacilli can be
seen [20]. Even though the bipolar staining, e.g. in
a Wright–Giemsa stain, is typical of Yersinia, it is
not enough to identify the organism [19,20]. Like
other Yersinia species, Y. pestis does not react, or
reacts unreliably, in commonly used biochemical
tests [18]. It is a fastidious organism that does not
form spores and is non-motile [18,20]. Lymph
node aspirates, spleen or liver biopsies and blood
and sputum specimens are inoculated on SBA and
MAC and in brain–heart infusion broth [4,20].
Bacteremia is characteristically intermittent, so
multiple blood cultures should be done to increase
sensitivity [4]. The optimal growth temperature of
Y. pestis is between 25 8C and 30 8C [4,19,20]. There-
fore, for rapid recovery of the organism, the speci-
mens should be incubated at 28 8C. Y. pestis
expresses a temperature-regulated antigen (F1)
when incubated at 37 8C that can be used for
identification [20]. Colonies grow slowly on SBA
and have the appearance of fried eggs when
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viewed under the stereomicroscope [19,20]. After
incubation for 48 h, the colonies are non-hemolytic,
1–2 mm in diameter, gray–white to slightly yellow,
and opaque [20]. Y. pestis grows as lactose-nega-
tive colonies on MAC [4]. After 24–48 h in brain–
heart infusion broth, Y. pestis gives characteristic
growth of flocculent or crumbly clumps at the
sides and bottom of the tube, while the rest of
the medium remains clear [20]. The clumps stay
visible even in a cloudy, contaminated broth cul-
ture [20]. Although the clumping growth in brain–
heart infusion broth is very suggestive of Y. pestis,
Y. pseudotuberculosis and Streptococcus pneumoniae
may exhibit the same type of clumping growth
[20]. Y. pseudotuberculosis and Y. pestis can be dif-
ferentiated by urease production, being positive
and negative, respectively [18].
The F1 antigen of Y. pestis is detected in serum
samples by an immunoassay [2,18,20]. Molecular
detection methods include a 50-nuclease PCR, for
the detection of the plasminogen activator gene
(pla) in blood and oropharyngeal swabs, and a
microchip PCR array. The assays have detection
thresholds of 2.1 105 copies of the pla target and
of 105 cells/L, respectively [2].
C L O S T R I D I U M B O T U L I N U M
Clostridium botulinum is a slightly curved Gram-
positive, sporulating motile rod [4], producing
seven distinct (A–G) neurotoxins, which are the
most toxic compounds known. Three forms of
botulism are known: food-borne botulism (intox-
ication) is the classical form; wound botulism
(infection and toxin production) is the rarest form;
and infant botulism (colonization of the intestines,
and toxin production) is the most common form
[4,21]. As biological weapons, botulinum toxins
may be aerosolized or used to sabotage food sup-
plies [2]. Inhalation causes the same symptoms as
ingestion, but the toxin is less likely to be found in
serum and stool [4]. In general, clinical laboratories
are not involved in the identification of Clostridium
botulinum or in detection of the neurotoxins [4]. A
mouse bioassay is classically used to detect the
presence of toxin in stools, vomitus, gastric con-
tents and serum [2,21]. Competitive reverse tran-
scription PCR measures the level of toxin-
encoding messenger RNA in Clostridium botuli-
num, and is more rapid and sensitive than the
bioassay [2]. Other PCR assays are used to detect
the C1 toxin gene in sediment and the type B geneT
ab
le
5
P
re
su
m
p
ti
v
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ti
at
io
n
o
f
B
ru
ce
ll
a
sp
ec
ie
s
[1
5]
T
es
t
B
ru
ce
ll
a
sp
p
.
A
ci
n
et
o
b
ac
te
r
sp
p
.
P
sy
ch
o
b
ac
te
r
p
h
en
y
lp
y
ru
v
ic
u
s
O
li
g
el
la
sp
p
.
H
ae
m
o
p
h
il
u
s
in
fl
u
en
za
e
F
ra
n
ci
se
ll
a
tu
la
re
n
si
s
S
p
ec
im
en
so
u
rc
e
B
lo
o
d
V
ar
io
u
s
V
ar
io
u
s
U
ri
n
ar
y
tr
ac
t
V
ar
io
u
s
V
ar
io
u
s
G
ra
m
st
ai
n
m
o
rp
h
o
lo
g
y
T
in
y
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
li
B
ro
ad
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
li
B
ro
ad
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
li
T
in
y
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
li
S
m
al
l
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
li
T
in
y
co
cc
o
b
ac
il
l
O
x
id
as
e
þ

þ
þ
V

U
re
a
h
y
d
ro
ly
si
s
þ
V
þ
þ
V

X
o
r
V
fa
ct
o
r
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t




þ

 2002 Copyright by the European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 8, 455–466
Nulens and Voss Laboratory diagnosis and biosafety issues of biological warfare agents 463
in feces [2]. These techniques are used when asses-
sing the infectious forms of botulism, in which the
toxin is produced by ingested organisms, but
would be ineffective in classical food-borne botu-
lism, in which the causative agent is primarily
toxin and not Clostridium botulinum itself [2]. Clos-
tridium botulinum may be cultured from speci-
mens, and isolates are subsequently tested for
toxogenicity [4]. Commercial identification sys-
tems are not very reliable, and may misidentify
Clostridium botulinum.
S M A L L P O X
Smallpox (variola) is a double-stranded DNA
virus that belongs to the genus orthopoxvirus.
Dissemination from person to person occurs via
aerosols from oropharyngeal secretions, by direct
contact, or via contaminated clothing [2,22].
Laboratory confirmation of the diagnosis of
smallpox is only performed in high-containment
facilities (BSL-4). Clinical specimens that contain
smallpox viruses remain infectious at room tem-
perature for 1 year, for several months at 4 8C, and
for years at 20 8C to 70 8C [4]. Smallpox virus
produces a soluble hemagglutinin [22]. The virus
is detected in vesicular or pustular fluid collected
from scraped lesions. Vesicular fluid is collected in
capillary tubes, on swabs, or on glass slides as a
thick smear, but without spreading the smear.
Suitable autopsy specimens include sections of
the lungs, liver, spleen, and kidneys. Specimens
can be stored at 20 8C or, even better, at 70 8C
[22]. Electron microscopy is commonly used, and
is very reliable for the preliminary identification of
characteristic brick-shaped virions, although no
differentiation between smallpox and monkeypox
is possible [2,4,22,23]. Guarnieri bodies, which are
eosinophilic aggregations of variola particles, can
be seen in Giemsa-stained smears of clinical speci-
mens, under a light microscope [4,23]. Different
human cell cultures are also used for culture of
smallpox, and detection of Guarnieri bodies. Var-
iola may produce a cytopathogenic effect within 1–
3 days, depending on the inoculum (Table 6). Pox
lesions in chorioallantoic membranes of chicken
embryos will develop if clinical specimens
infected with smallpox are inoculated. Soluble
viral antigen is found in blood, vesicular/pustule
contents and extracts from scrapings. It can be
detected with complement fixation, immunofluor-
escence, or Ouchterlony techniques [4]. The ser-
ologic diagnosis is established by a four-fold rise in
titer in complement fixation or hemagglutination
inhibition [4,22]. The ultimate identification and
characterization of smallpox is accomplished using
PCR and restriction length polymorphism [2].
V I R A L H E M O R R H A G I C F E V E R S
The viral hemorrhagic fever syndrome may be caus-
ed by several RNA viruses from the Filoviridae,
Table 6 Diagnosis of variola by laboratory tests [4]a
Stage Material used
Microscopic
examination (1 h)
Detection or
isolation of virusb
(1–3 days)
Antigen
detectionc
(3–24 h)
Detection of
antibodiesd
(3 h to 3 days)
Pre-eruptive Blood þ/ þ/ 
Maculopapular Blood þ/ þ/ þ/
Skin lesions þ þ þ
Saliva þ
Vesicular Blood þ/ þ
Skin lesions þ þ þ
Pustular Blood þ
Pustular fluid þ/ þ þ
Crusting Blood þ
Crusts  þ þ
aThe time required for completion of each test is given. Results: þ, usually positive; , usually negative; þ/, positive or
negative.
bCulture on chorioallantoic membrane of chicken embryos or in tissue culture.
cComplement fixation, agar gel precipitation, or immunofluorescence.
dHemagglutination inhibition, complement fixation, or neutralization. Antibodies may appear earlier in previously
vaccinated patients.þ, rise in antibody titer.
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Arenaviridae, Bunyaviridae, and Flaviviridae [2].
These viruses are highly infectious by the aerosol
route. Only BSL-4 facilities are equipped for the
diagnosis of viral hemorrhagic fevers. Culture,
serology, immunohistochemical techniques and
amplification methods are used for diagnosis
[2,4,24].
Blood, urine and throat swabs or washings are
used for virus isolation; liver biopsies are used
postmortem. Virus isolation is usually successful
only if specimens are obtained within the first few
days of illness. For isolation, blood, cerebrospinal
fluid, brain or other tissues should be collected,
and refrigerated at 4 8C. Heparinized whole blood
or homogenized clots are satisfactory for virus
isolation [24].
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